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I. INTRODUCTION
In connection with "restitutionary" remedies and the practicing
bar, it is probably safe to say that there is both good news and bad
news. The good news is that most practicing lawyers have heard of
restitutionary remedies. Furthermore, most practicing lawyers generally know that restitutionary remedies have something to do with "unjust enrichment." Indeed, many lawyers may even have requested
such remedies from time to time in civil actions, or have defended
against requests for such remedies. The bad news, however, is this:
The vast majority of practicing lawyers do not really understand restitutionary remedies, and do not really understand why such remedies
can be extraordinarily useful in certain circumstances. In short,
although most practicing lawyers know a little bit about restitutionary remedies, they do not know enough.
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvIEw.
Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. The author would like to
thank Catherine O'Daniel for the assistance she provided in researching this
essay.
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The following analysis-which focuses on the strategic value of the
use of restitutionary remedies-attempts to address this problem.
First, this Article briefly describes a "functional" system for classifying
remedies, a system that focuses on the "what" and the "why" of remedies. Then, the analysis emphasizes the difference between the why of
compensation and the why of restitution. Finally, the analysis describes three different categories of "strategic" reasons for differentiating between restitutionary and compensatory remedies. The first
category involves the amount of possible remedy. In this category this
Article discusses, among other things, "losing money" contracts, timing issues, economic profiteering, and, of all things, "intangible gains."
(In this last context, incidentally, the analysis addresses a very important modern topic in the law, sexual exploitation in non-employment
situations.) This Article then turns to procedural issues involved with
obtaining restitutionary and. compensatory remedies. Lastly, the
analysis describes differences between restitution and compensation
in connection with the enforcement of remedies, i.e., in connection
with the methods that lawyers use to turn abstract judgments into
concrete things.
II. A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM OF CIVIL REMEDIES
The most common method for classifying civil remedies starts with
the distinction between "legal" remedies and "equitable" remedies.1
Unfortunately, a major problem with this system exists. As everybody
knows, the whole law/equity distinction really makes no sense in the
modern world. This is so because the two historically separate court
systems that originally granted these different kinds of remedies have
now, for the most part, been combined. Hence, a classification of civil
remedies into law/equity categories simply makes no sense in modern
times.
I would suggest that a much better classification system for civil
remedies turns on the present day functions of the various civil remedies and on the rationales behind the grant of such traditional remedies rather than on their historic origins. In other words, a much
better classification system for modern civil remedies starts with the
"what" of remedies-what remedies ultimately produce-and the
"why" of remedies-why they produce it. One such "What-why" classification system might look like this.2
1. See generally, DAN B. DOBBS,LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUTrY, RESTrrUTION
11-12 (1993)(explaining the classification between legal and equitable remedies).
See also, DouGLAs LAYcOcc, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES.
2. For a somewhat different version of the following analysis see Paul T. Wangerin,
Restitution for Intangible Gains, 54 LA. L. REv. 339 (1993).
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First, remedies can be classified by what they ultimately produce,
the nature, in short, of the judgment entered in connection with them.
Four distinct "what's" come to mind.
Figure 1:
The "What' of Remedies

Money Remedies

Specific Remedies

F

Injunctions
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Some civil remedies-a group that herein will be called "money
remedies"--provide successful litigants with judgments for money. A
second group of civil remedies-that herein will be called "specific
remedies"--provides successful litigants with judgments ordering
other people or entities to do certain things. 3 A third category called
injunctions provides successful litigants with judgments ordering
other people or entities to do something, or, more commonly, not to do
something. (To the extent that injunctions require people to do things,
these kinds of remedies are similar to specific remedies.) Finally,
some civil remedies called declaratory remedies, do not provide disputants with judgments for money, or judgments requiring acts or nonacts. Rather, these kinds of remedies simply provide litigants with
judicial declarationsof legal rights or responsibilities. 4
The second part of a functional classification system for remedies
involves the "why" of remedies. In connection with the system described herein, no less than six different "why's" or rationales for remedies exist.
Sometimes courts grant remedies in order to compensate individuals or entities for loss caused by past wrongful acts. At other times,
courts grant remedies requiring restitution of gain by defendant
caused by past wrongful acts. Third, courts sometimes grant remedies
that punish individuals or entities for wrongful past conduct. Fourth,
courts sometimes provide remedies aimed at preventing future wrongful conduct, or conduct that might otherwise lead in the future to actions for compensation, restitution, or punishment. Fifth, courts
3. The most common kind of specific remedy, but by no means the only kind, is
specific performance.
4. Note here a critically important point about declaratory remedies. Suits for declaratory remedies produce only a declaration of rights or responsibilities. That
is all they provide. Conversely, the other kinds of remedies-money, specific, and
injunctive-provide disputants with both a declaration of rights and responsibilities and something else, namely judgments for money and acts or prevention of

acts. Thus, for the most part it makes no sense for traditional plaintiffs to seek
declaratory remedies rather than other kinds of remedies.
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The "Why" of Remedies]
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sometimes grant remedies that have the effect of "preempting" other
individuals or entities from themselves obtaining remedies. 5 Finally,
courts today sometimes grant remedies using a rationale that is
roughly comparable to the "new writs" ration'ale of the very earliest
equity courts. (The early equity courts, it should be recalled, frequently created "new writs" in situations where standardized law
remedies were not available. These new writs became the predecessors of the now standardized equitable remedies.)
Note two important introductory points about the two-part "WhatWhy" remedies classification system just described. First, skilled lawyers can, and indeed should, mix and match the various what's and
why's of remedies. For example, lawyers who want to obtain money
remedies might sometimes use the rationale of compensation and at
other times use the rationale of restitution-or punishment. Similarly, lawyers who wish to use the rationale of restitution might sometimes seek money remedies, but other times might seek specific
remedies. Skilled lawyers can, and indeed in many instances should,
seek several different kinds of remedies in the same action, and should
use several different rationales in the same action. Thus, in many situations lawyers can seek alternatively or cumulatively, both a money
remedy and a specific remedy. Likewise, lawyers can alternatively or
cumulatively employ the rationales of both compensation and
restitution.
III.

RESTITUTIONARY AND COMPENSATORY REMEDIES

Restitutionary remedies 6 are perhaps best described by contrasting them to compensatory remedies. Compensatory remedies, it
5. The rationale of preemption is principally used by traditional defendants in civil
actions who themselves seek a remedy. What happens, essentially, is this: A
person or entity anticipates that someone else will in the future bring an action
against them. Rather than simply wait for this action to be filed, however, this
potential defendant decides to initiate the action herself. Hence, the potential

defendant goes to court and asks for a judgment declaring non-liability in the
anticipated action.
6. For perhaps the most provocative recent treatment of the law of restitution see
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: IntellectualPropertyand the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992); Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:
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should be recalled, whether those remedies be money remedies, specific remedies, injunctions, or declarations, deal with losses to injured
parties caused by past injuries. Restitutionary remedies, on the other
hand, focus on gains to wrongfully acting parties rather than losses to
injured parties. For instance, in connection with compensatory money
remedies, courts turn past losses into money. Similarly, in connection
with compensatory specific remedies, courts turn past losses into acts.
Conversely, in connection with restitutionary money remedies, courts
turn past gains into money. Additionally, in connection with restitutionary specific remedies, courts turn past gains into acts.
There are three critically important points about the foregoing distinctions between restitutionary and compensatory remedies. First,
as noted earlier, lawyers can and should play mix and match with the
"what's" and the "why's" of remedies. Hence, the rationales, of both
compensation and restitution can be used with both money remedies
and specific remedies.7
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992);
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and EncouragementTheory, 41 STA. L. REv. 1343 (1989). For the best
short summary of the basic rules in this body of law see Douglas Laycock, The
Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEE. L. REv. 1277 (1989). See ROBERT
GOF & GAETH H. JONES, TE LAW OF RESTrrON (1966); GEORGE E. PAMR,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTON (1978) (These two books deal with nothing but restitution.). Also, several books have lengthy discussions on this topic. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoN m cTs 946-55 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN D. CALAmA & JoSEPH M. PEmio, CoNTRACTs 647-58 (3rd ed. 1987); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoTRrAcTs 718 (3rd ed. 1990); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 550-707.

Numerous scholarly articles comment on the law of restitution. See, e.g., Robert
Childres & Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 433 (1969); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); Fuller & Perdue, The RelianceInterest in ContractDamages I, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937); Lindsay R. Jeanblanc, Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a
Legal Benefit, 26 IND. L.J. 1 (1950); Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of
Frauds:Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. REv. 1
(1950); Saul Levmore, ExplainingRestitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65 (1985); Joseph
M. Perrillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 CoLum. L.
REv. 37 (1981); Judy Becker Sloan, QuantumMeruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42
DEPAuL L. REv. 399 (1.992); John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred
without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1966).
7. As noted, the most common kind of specific remedy is specific performance, a kind
of remedy granted in breach of contract situations. Other kinds of specific remedies also exist, however, notably specific remedies involving the rationales of restitution and tortious conduct.
For example, "specific restitution" and "replevin" both produce judgments ordering a wrongdoer to restore, "in species," a wrongful gain, i.e. the gain itself.
For example, assume that someone wrongfully appropriated a prize winning bull.
Normally, of course, someone seeking restitution in this situation would convert
the defendanes gain into money, and seek a money remedy. However, assume
that the owner in this situation wanted the defendant to return the bull itself. In
this situation, the owner would seek the remedy of specific restitution or replevin.
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Second, many judges and lawyers use the term "restitution" quite
loosely.8 For example, judges and lawyers often talk and write about
requiring criminals to make "restitution" to the victims of their
crimes. 9 These judges and lawyers then describe a process that requires the criminals to compensate their victims for losses experienced. This, however, is not restitution, it is compensation.
Moreover, judges and lawyers often talk and write about requiring
tortfeasors or contract breachers to make "restitution." However,
these judges and lawyers then describe a process that requires wrongacting individuals to compensate injured parties for losses. Again,
this is not restitution, it is compensation.lO
Further, people involved in the current debate about the ownership
and return of "cultural treasures" often use the term restitution.11
The Greek people, goes the argument, and not the British Museum,
own the Elgin Marbles. Thus, those sculptures must be returned to
Greece. Again, however, since the protagonists in these debates often
spend most of their time discussing losses rather than gains, the debate really turns on compensation rather than restitution. As a final
example, people involved in civil rights litigation sometimes talk
about the need to make "restitution" to the victims of racial or gender
Another specific remedy also exists, although one rarely used. Usually, of
course, people or entities who have experienced a loss due to a tortious act convert the loss into a monetary amount and seek a money remedy. Sometimes,
however, these injured parties might seek action rather than money. Assume, for
example, that a brain surgeon wrongfully smashes someone's head with a sledge
hammer. Normally the injured party in this situation would convert their loss
into money, and seek a money remedy against the surgeon. However, nothing
prevents this injured party from asking a court to require the defendant to do
something to fix the injury, such as do reparative brain surgery. Assume further
that the injured party in this dispute wants that surgeon himself or herself to
repair the injury, i.e. to do brain surgery. Usually, remedies like this are called
"reparative injunctions." A much better name for this kind of remedy, however, a
name clearly describing exactly what they do, is "specific reparation."
8. This point is also made by Douglas Laycock. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 128283.
9. Many discussions of this topic exist. For an early and influential one see Alan T.
Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crimes: Assessing the Role of the
Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52 (1982).
10. It is not at all clear how this kind of loose thinking got started in connection with
the law of torts and contracts. One thought, however, is this: The notion of promissory estoppel only took solid root in American law during the middle part of the
20th century. Prior to that time mere reliance on a promise could not generate a
remedy in contract. Thus, many relying promisees experienced severe losses for
which no compensation seemed available. Since many courts wished to grant
compensation in these situations, however, they simply stated that "restitution"
should be available. Of course, these cases had nothing whatsoever to do with
restitution. But, nobody in those early days seemed to be thinking very carefully
about this topic.

11.

See, e.g., JEAN'r

GREENFiELD, THE RETuN OF CuLTUAfL TaFAsuxS (1989).
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discrimination.12 Discussion of civil rights protection generally addresses losses to the victims of prejudice rather than gains to the victimizers. Therefore, what actually is being discussed is compensation
rather than restitution.13
Third, in many litigation situations, little or no difference exists
between the amount of the losses experienced by injured parties-i.e.
the amount at issue in compensation actions-and the amount of the
gains experienced by the injuring parties-i.e. the amounts at issue in
restitution actions.' 4 The losses that the injured parties experience
are equal to the gains reaped by the injuring parties. In many breach
of contract situations, for example, the monetary losses of the nonbreaching parties are roughly the same as the monetary gains of the
breaching party. Hence, it often makes no difference-at least in connection with the amount of money produced by a remedy-whether
the action proceeds on a compensation or restitution theory.
The existence of the foregoing fact-that in many litigation situations no functional difference exists between the amount of the remedy produced by a restitution theory and the amount of the remedy
produced by a compensation theory-should not be allowed to distract
attention from two important matters. First, in at least some kinds of
situations, a major difference exists between the amount of loss and
the amount of gain. Therefore, in those situations it is extremely important to think through notions of restitution and compensation.
Second, major procedural differences exist between the way restitutionary and compensatory remedies are obtained. Furthermore, major
differences exists between the way restitutionary and compensatory
remedies are enforced. It is to these ideas that this analysis now
turns.

12. See, e.g., (RicHAm F. AmRiCA, TnE WEALTH OF RACES: TEE PRESENT

VALUE OF

BENEFrrS FROM PAST INJUSTICES) (1990).

13. Admittedly, real restitutionary remedies could be employed in all three of the
kinds of situations just described. In the criminal context, for example, criminals
sometimes sell their stories to the movies. When they do this, they reap unjust
gains. If these gains are the subject of suit, a real claim in restitution will be
raised. Likewise, contract breachers and tortfeasors often experience gains from
their wrongful acts. When courts focus on these gains they are actually talking
about restitution. Furthermore, if the discussion of cultural treasures turned on
the fact that the new owners gained something unjustly, rather than on the fact
that the original owners lost something unjustly, then, clearly, the debate would
be one about restitution. Finally, in the civil rights context attempts might be
made to calculate the gains that Anglo-Saxon people have experienced over the
years as a result of discrimination against African Americans. These gains-if
any way could be devised to calculate them-might then be the subject of restitutionary claims. See AMERICA, supra note 12, at 163.
14. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1283-84.
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IV. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RESTITUTIONARY
REMEDIES
Perhaps the best way to think generally about the strategic value
of restitutionary remedies-and, hence, the contrast with compensatory remedies-is to divide the topic into three distinct subtopics.
First, restitutionary theories can significantly increase the amount of
the remedy that litigants can obtain. Second, in some situations litigants who use restitutionary theories can use litigation procedures
that would not be available to litigants using compensatory theories.
Finally, and most importantly, litigants who use restitutionary theories in many cases have very powerful enforcement tools; tools that
allow them to turn abstract judgments into real actions. These enforcement tools are not generally available when litigants use compensatory theories.
A. The Amount of Remedies
Two things must immediately be noted about the amount of remedies awardable in connection with restitutionary theories. First, as
noted above, in many breach of contract situations the losses that
plaintiffs experience in connection with particular events are roughly
equal to the gains experienced by the defendants in those actions. For
example, the gains that accrue to a seller who breaches a contract and
then sells to somebody else usually are roughly comparable to the
losses incurred by the original buyer. Therefore, in many breach of
contract situations it makes no difference in terms of the amount of
the remedy whether the theory is one of restitution or one of compensation. Second, in many tort situations, including most negligent tort
situations, plaintiffs experience a loss, but defendants experience no
gain. In connection with a car accident, for example, a pedestrian
might experience $100,000 in loss. However, the driver of the car that
caused the injury incurs no gain. Hence, in many tort law situations it
makes no sense to seek a restitutionary remedy rather than a compensatory remedy, at least if the amount of the remedy is the only thing
that matters.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in some kinds of situations, both in
tort and in contract, gains are greater than losses.1 5 In these kinds of
situations plaintiffs almost certainly should use restitutionary rather
than compensatory theories.16
Sometimes, a gain exists, but no loss occurs. The Qlwell case is
representative. In Olwell'7, the defendant reaped a significant gain

through the use of an egg-washing machine that actually belonged to
15. Id. at 1284-88.
16. See LAYcocK, supra note 6, at 1287; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 637-38.
17. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
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someone else.18 The machine washed eggs much faster and at much
less cost than manual workers.1 9 The actual owner of the machine did
not even know that the defendant was using it.20 Therefore, the
owner arguably experienced no quantifiable loss.
Admittedly, situations like that in Olwell are unusual, but they do
occur. When such situations occur, restitutionary remedies are more
appropriate than compensatory ones. Two examples suffice, one involving "losing money" contracts, and the other involving what might
be called "economic profiteering".
In "losing money" contract cases, some person or entity enters into
a contract that ultimately proves to be extremely burdensome to them.
For example, a construction company might agree to pave a road for
$1 million. Later, after one-half of the work is done, the company realizes that its own costs on the job will be $2 million. These facts which
are not uncommon, are not what produces a "losing money" contract
case. Rather, what happens in "losing money" cases-and it is quite
rare-is that the non-losing party breaches. For example, in the foregoing situation assume that the city or county-the non-losing
party-breaches. (Why a non-losing party would breach in such a situation is a mystery.)
The problem presented by losing money contract cases ultimately
is this: If the non-breaching party-in the example, the construction
company-uses a compensatory theory, it recovers nothing. This is so
because the non-breaching parties incurred no loss as a result of the
breach. However, if the non-breaching construction company uses a
restitutionary theory, it might recover a large amount of money,
namely the gain to the defendant. In the foregoing situation, the
breaching party, the city or county, arguably reaped a $1 million gain
if the job was half completed at the time of the breach. A restitutionary remedy might require the city to disgorge that $1 million.
It is important to note a fundamental point about losing money
contract situations. Some courts have concluded that a "ceiling" exists
in connection with these restitutionary actions, a ceiling erected by
the contract price itself. What that ceiling actually is in individual
cases, however, is unclear. Further, and more significantly, this whole
issue of the ceiling in losing money cases is itself unsettled. Nevertheless, even when a ceiling rule exists, losing money plaintiffs who use
restitutionary theories may well collect larger judgments than losing
money plaintiffs who use compensatory theories.
Another type of situation, a type potentially far more important
than losing money contract situations, may also produce recoverable
18. Id. at 652-53.
19. Id. at 653.
20. Id.
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gains that are greater than recoverable losses. These cases involve
what might be called "economic profiteering."21 In economic profiteering cases, someone consciously makes a decision not to do something
that clearly will maximize safety for others. This decision is made because that person concludes that the cost of doing the thing is greater
than the liability costs that are likely to accrue if it is not done. The
famous "Pinto" cases 22 provide a perfect example. Assume that a

manufacturer decides that it will cost $10 to add a particular kind of
safety mechanism to a car-say a flexible tube for filling the gas tank
rather than a rigid tube. (The precise facts in the actual Pinto cases,
incidentally, are changed a bit in this example.) Further, assume that
the manufacturer concludes that omitting this safety feature will allow it to reap $100 million in extra profits and that omitting it will
ultimately cost the manufacturer $10 million in liability payments10 fatalities at $1 million per fatality. Now assume that the manufacturer does not add the safety feature, and thereafter, X buys one of
these cars and is turned to toast when the car explodes. What happens? If X brings a claim based on a theory of compensation, she
might recover roughly $1 million. That is, after all, her loss. Conversely, if X brings a claim based on restitution she might recover
$100 million. That is the amount of the manufacturer's wrongful gain.
There are two critically important points to be considered about
profiteering cases. First, many will argue that people and companies
constantly make cost/benefit decisions much like the one just described and that nothing is wrong with doing precisely that. For example, people who truly want to prevent automobile injuries to
themselves and their passengers can buy automobiles that will almost
completely eliminate the likelihood of car-related injuries. (Humvees,
for example, noted for their high degree of stability, are available for
purchase. Cars such as Volvos are also said to have exceptionally good
safety records.) The fact is, however, that in this situation, and in
other comparable ones, most people decide that the high cost of an
item is simply not worth the benefit achieved. Therefore, it can be
argued that there is nothing inherently wrong with the type of decision-making that is the subject of economic profiteering cases.
Second, many people will note in connection with the foregoing example that a punitive theory might also produce a large judgment for
X, perhaps even $100 million. Indeed, that is exactly what happened
in the Pinto case.2 3 However, several major problems presently exist
with attempts to get punitive remedies. Currently, statutes in many
21. Laycock indirectly discusses the following ideas in connection with his comments
about the potentially "punitive" aspects of restitutionary theories. Laycock,
supra note 6, at 1288-90.
22. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 CAL. Rpm. 348 (Cal. 1981).
23. Id.
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states severely limit the amount of punitive remedies. Moreover, the
law is not at all clear at the present time-at least in the United
States Supreme Court-as to the standard of proof necessary in connection with punitive remedies. Neither of these restrictions seems to
exist, however, in connection with restitutionary remedies.
Another issue that must be considered in connection with the juxtaposition of compensatory and restitutionary remedies relates to the
timing of the remedy. The difference is this: In connection with compensation, courts generally calculate the amount of the loss at the
time the wrongful event occurred. Conversely, courts may calculate
the amount of a wrongful gain either at the time the wrongful event
occurred, or at the time of judgment in an action involving the event.
Consider the consequences of these different rules. Assume that X, a
dealer in sports memorabilia, tricked Y into selling him an O.J. Simpson "rookie" card for $10. X pulled this trick on Y before O.J.'s current
troubles. At the time of the trick the card was worth $100. The card is
now worth, for the sake of this example, $1,000. Assume that Y successfully brings an action against X. If Y uses a compensatory theory,
she recovers only $90, namely, her loss at the time of the event. However, if Y uses a restitutionary theory, she potentially recovers $990;
that is, Xs gain at the time of the judgment involving the event.
One last issue must be mentioned in connection with the comparison of compensatory and restitutionary remedies, an issue that is, to
say the least, cutting edge. Several years ago, this author suggested
in Restitutionfor Intangible Gains24 that the notion of "non-economic"
or "non-pecuniary" losses has, or should have, a counterpart in restitution. Non-economic losses are losses such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of reputation, consortium, and the like. I
suggested that the comparable non-economic gains should be recognized. For example, if losses from wrongfully caused pain and suffering can be remedied, so also should gains from wrongfully caused
pleasure and enjoyment be remedied. Similarly, I suggested that if
loss of reputation by plaintiffs could be addressed by remedies, a gain
in reputation by defendants should also be recognized and addressed.
My point, admittedly, is an abstract one, and one that seems unlikely to rapidly sweep through the legal community. Nevertheless, in
a number of extremely important contexts that idea-restitution for
intangible gains-might generate remedies where no remedies currently exist. Consider, for example, the problem of "street harassment," a problem for which no standard compensatory remedy seems
to exist. My notion potentially provides a remedy. Street harassers,
after all, engage in such harassment because they personally gain
some sort of sick pleasure or enjoyment from doing so. In short, these
24. Wangerin, supra note 2, at 340-50.
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harassers reap an intangible gain from their conduct. Such harassment can be remedied.
Consider also the problem of non-employment sexual exploitation.
In some sexual exploitation cases a person who is not an employer, but
who is in a position of trust, enters into a sexual relationship with
someone dependent on him. Usually, but not always, the perpetrator
in these cases is male and the victim is female. For example, male
lawyers sometimes enter into exploitative sexual relationships with
clients. Similarly, male doctors sometimes enter into these relationships with patients, clergy with parishioners, bankers with customers,
et cetera. Generally, the victims of this kind of exploitation cannot
recover remedies in these situations because no employment relationship exists between them and the victimizer and because both victim
and victimizer are considered "consenting" adults. However, my
analysis suggests a way to provide remedies. Sexual exploiters reap
enormous amounts of intangible gains from their activities. Those
gains might be compensable in restitution.
B. Obtaining Restitutionary and Compensatory Remedies
As important as the ideas just described may be in connection with
differentiating between compensatory and restitutionary remedies,
equally important differences between compensation and restitution
exist in connection with the procedures used to obtain remedies. Two
such differences are worthy of extended discussion involving causes of
action and the historic distinctions between law and equity. Further,
a brief comment must also be made in this context regarding limitation of actions.
Everybody in the legal profession knows that cause of action
problems constantly create problems in connection with claims that
are intuitively meritorious. Countless intuitively meritorious claims
involving contract breaches, for example, are not litigated at all, or are
not successfully litigated, because a necessary writing is missing.
Moreover, countless intuitively meritorious claims in tort or property
law are not litigated at all, or are not litigated successfully, because an
individual element of a tort or property cause of action is missing.
Restitutionary theories can sometimes solve these problems. 25
This is so because of an important notion in the law of restitution, a
notion that is, sadly, unknown to many lawyers. As noted earlier, almost all lawyers know that the cause of action for restitution involves
"unjust enrichment." What most lawyers do not know, however, is
that the "unjust" part of this two-part notion can be established in two
distinct ways. Obviously, claimants seeking restitution can establish
the unjust part of unjust enrichment by proving a traditional cause of
25. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1282-86.
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action in tort, contract, etc. Indeed, this is the most common method.
However, the law of restitution itself clearly indicates that restitution
claimants do not have to prove up such a cause of action to establish
injustice. Rather, such claimants can satisfy the unjust part of the
unjust enrichment standard simply by proving that pertinent activities were intuitively wrong, unfair, or unjust. In other words, restitution claimants need not establish all of the elements of traditional
causes of action in order to obtain a remedy.
A classic case, from the heyday of traditional contract law, illustrates this point. In Mills v. Wyman, 26 the plaintiff provided death
bed care to a young man. Neither the recipient of the care, nor anybody else agreed in advance to pay for this care. After the care was
provided, a parent promised to pay for the already rendered aid.
Later, however, the parent refused to follow through on that promise
and the care-giver sued. Not surprisingly-since this occurred during
the heyday of traditional contract law-the plaintiffs claim for compensation failed because of a cause of action problem. What was missing, of course, was consideration for the promise to pay. Past
consideration, i.e. the past provision of help, was not good enough-at
least under traditional rules-to make the promise legally enforceable. Interestingly, however, the plaintiffs claim for restitution in this
case succeeded despite the seemingly fatal cause of action problem.
The court concluded the promisor was clearly enriched through the
provision of care. Further, the failure to pay for that enrichment, especially in light of the subsequent promise to pay for it, produced an
injustice.
Cause of action issues are not the only reasons to differentiate between restitutionary and compensatory theories in connection with
procedures for obtaining remedies. Law/equity issues also pose some
interesting twists.
As noted at the outset, everybody generally knows that no substantive reasons currently exist for differentiating between legal remedies
and equitable remedies. Having said that, however, it still must be
noted that lawyers nevertheless must continue to differentiate between such remedies. The dead hand of the past still controls.
The dead hand of the law/equity past still controls in four distinct
contexts. First, claimants who seek remedies that have their roots in
law generally are entitled to jury trials, whereas claimants who seek
remedies that have their roots in equity generally are not entitled to
juries. Second, at least in theory, claimants who seek remedies that
have their roots in equity must satisfy the "irreparable injury" rule
(also referred to as the "inadequate remedy at law" rule) whereas
claimants who seek remedies with roots in law need not, even in the26. 20 Mass. (3 Pick) 207 (1825)
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ory, satisfy that rule. Third, in theory, courts ruling on remedies issues with roots in equity can exercise greater discretion than they can
in cases involving remedies which have their roots in law. Finally,
claimants who seek remedies with roots in equity may encounter
problems with a group of moral or religious limitations on remediese.g. laches or unclean hands. Claimants who have themselves done
something which the law disapproves of may not recover in equitywhereas claimants who seek remedies that have roots in law need not,
for the most part, worry about such limitations.
These distinctions bring us back to restitution and compensation.
Claimants who seek a money remedy involving compensation are generally bound by the rules applicable to remedies with roots in law.
This is so because, for all practical purposes, the only money remedy
involving compensation is damages, and damages has its roots in law.
Conversely, and here rests the key point, claimants who seek a money
remedy involving restitution can frequently pick among several different remedies, some of which have their roots in law and some of which
have their roots in equity. For example, claimants who wish to obtain
restitution in money, and who wish to do so on the law side of the law/
equity dividing line, can ask for the remedy of "quasi-contract." When
seeking quasi-contract, claimants allege that defendants impliedly
promised to pay for a gain received and that the failure to keep that
implied promise produces injustice. Conversely, claimants who wish
to obtain restitution in money, and who wish to do so on the equity
side of the law/equity divide, can ask for the remedy of constructive
trust. When seeking recovery via constructive trusts, claimants allege
that defendants impliedly agreed to hold a gain received in trust and
that failure to hold that gain in trust produces injustice.
This raises an important point. In many situations, claimants can
seek either the remedy of quasi-contract or the remedy of constructive
trust and get exactly the same result. In short, the two different remedies are often identical. However, one of these remedies has its roots
in law and the other in equity. In short, claimants who use restitution
theories in connection with money remedies may well be able to
choose either a law remedy or an equity remedy. Nothing comparable
to that exists for claimants who use compensation theories in connection with money remedies.
One last procedural matter must yet be mentioned in connection
with this analysis of the mechanisms for obtaining restitutionary remedies. This involves limitations of actions. 2 7
Limitations of actions establish a time-frame during which individuals who wish to obtain a judicial remedy must commence their actions. The theory behind these limitations is two-fold. First, the law
27. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 656.
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has concluded-and who can doubt the sense of this-that even
wrong-acting people have the right at some point in time to put behind
them their wrong actions. In short, at some point in time bygones are
bygones. Second, the law has concluded that evidentiary problems
that exist in proving wrongfulness, and in defending against claims of
wrongfulness, are likely to be tremendously magnified if long periods
of time have elapsed between the time of the alleged wrongful acts and
the time an action is brought regarding those acts.
What then, does this have to do with restitutionary remedies? Two
things come to mind. First, as noted repeatedly herein, litigants who
seek restitutionary remedies can often either seek remedies that have
their roots in law or remedies that have their roots in equity. Comparable remedies exist in restitution on either side of the law/equity line.
This means litigants who wish to obtain restitutionary remedies
might well have the choice between an action governed by the standard statute of limitations in law or an action governed by the more
amorphous concept of laches in equity. For example, a litigant who
seeks the remedy called "quasi-contract" might encounter a statute of
limitation (because quasi-contract has its roots in equity) whereas a
litigant who seeks the essentially identical remedy of "constructive
trust" might encounter only the limitation of laches.
Frequently, the law now extrapolates statutory time limits to
laches matters. Consequently, the laches time limits and the statutory time limits are generally the same. However, there are exceptions. Even in jurisdictions that apply limitations, courts ruling on
requests for remedies with their roots in equity sometimes extend the
laches time period beyond the comparable statutory period.
The second point regarding limitations is considerably more subtle.
Recall that it was noted earlier that the "wrongfulness" element of the
restitutionary standard-i.e. the "unjust" part of "unjust enrichment7-can be established either by proving up a standard cause of
action in torts, contracts, or the like or by generally proving wrongfulness. Restitution claimants need not be able to prove up standard
causes of action. Although what this fact means in connection with
limitations of actions is not exactly clear, the implications are fascinating. If a restitutionary claim is not based on a standard cause of
action in torts or contracts, what is the pertinent limitations period?
Because neither a tort theory nor a contract theory is being used, the
respective limitations periods do not seem applicable. Thus, a great
deal of ambiguity regarding limitations periods exists in this context,
ambiguity that almost certainly can be put to use by knowledgeable
plaintiffs.
A brief summary of these procedural matters is now apropos.
First, claimants who seek restitutionary remedies-as opposed to
compensatory remedies-need not prove up standard causes of action
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in tort, contract, or the like. This is so because the "unjust" part of the
"unjust enrichment" standard can be established either through proof
of a standard cause of action or through general notions of fairness
and justice. Hence, claimants who face serious cause of action
problems in connection with standard compensatory remedies, might
well be able to overcome those problems by seeking restitutionary
remedies. Second, claimants who seek restitutionary remedies can, in
many instances, seek essentially identical remedies on either side of
the law/equity dividing line. The remedy of quasi-contract, for example, is on the law side, whereas the essentially identical remedy of constructive trust is on the equity side. The strategic implications of this
ability to choose either law or equity remedies are immense. Third,
claims for restitution produce intriguing limitation of action issues.
This is so because such claims can be on either side of the law/equity
line and because such claims can, in some instances, be based on theories other than standard tort or contract causes of action.
C. Miscellaneous Strategic Matters
Three additional points about the strategic value of restitutionary
remedies must yet be noted. One deals with "preliminary" remedies.
Another deals with attorney fees. And the last involves payments of
pre-judgment interest. In all of these situations, lawyers who understand restitutionary remedies may have a distinct advantage over
lawyers who do not understand such remedies.
Preliminary remedies are principally used to preserve the status
quo during lawsuits. Thus, for example, lawyers generally use temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions to preserve the
status quo regarding defendants' ability to respond to injunctive remedies during the pendency of suits seeking permanent injunctions.
Likewise, lawyers generally use remedies like pre-judgment attachment and pre-judgment garnishment to preserve the status quo regarding defendants' ability to respond to money judgments during the
pendency of lawsuits seeking money. Interestingly, a little restitutionary twist exists in this context-at least in connection with preliminary money remedies.
Most lawyers know about, and sometimes use, preliminary money
remedies such as pre-judgment attachment and garnishment. 28 Few
lawyers, however, seem to know about, and even fewer seem to use, a
preliminary money remedy based on restitutionary theories. This
remedy is called "preliminary replevin. 2 9
Replevin, it should be recalled, is a specific restitutionary remedy.
In short, plaintiffs who seek replevin do not follow the standard pro28. Dobbs, supra note 2 at § 1.3.
29. Id. at §§ 1.3, 17(3).
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cess of converting a wrongful gain into money and then seeking a
money remedy. Rather, plaintiffs who seek replevin ask for the gain
itself to be restored. Assume, for example, that a dispute exists regarding the ownership of a prize-winning bull-"Rose of Aberlone, Jr."
The plaintiff, who is out of possession of the bull, claims that the defendant who possesses the bull has wrongfully gained by that possession. Normally the plaintiff would seek to convert the value of the
gain into money and then seek a money remedy. Sometimes, however,
the plaintiff wants the bull itself. In this case, the plaintiff would file a
claim for either replevin (rooted in law) or specific restitution (rooted
in equity).
Preliminary replevin is simply a preliminary version of the process
of replevin just described. When this preliminary remedy is available,
plaintiffs who seek this remedy can potentially obtain restoration of
the gain itself prior to trial. In effect, preliminary replevin then becomes similar to what would occur if a preliminary injunction were
entered, or if a temporary restraining order (TRO) were used. But,
because preliminary replevin is not a preliminary injunction, and because it is not a TRO, different rules apply when it is used.30
The second miscellaneous restitutionary matter involves attorney
fees. 31 All lawyers in the United States know that the general rules
regarding fees-the so-called "American Rule," is that parties to disputes pay their own attorney fees. All lawyers also know, however,
that the American Rule is subject to countless exceptions. Many statutes, for example, provide for the payment of attorney fees. Similarly,
the "common fund" exception and the "private attorney general" exception frequently produce payments of attorney fees despite the provisions of the American Rule. Few lawyers, however, seem to know
that both the common fund exception and the private attorney general
exception have their basis in restitutionary theories.32
The rationale is straight-forward. In connection with both the
common fund exception and the private attorney general exception,
the named plaintiffs' actions are said to benefit a group of individuals
other than the named plaintiffs. In other words, a group of people
other than the named plaintiffs gain because of plaintiffs' victory
against the defendant. That gain, of course, becomes the subject of a
restitutionary theory. Unless the non-named plaintiffs are required to
help pay the attorney's fees associated with the production of this
gain, the receipt by these non-named plaintiffs of the gain would be
"unjust".
It might be argued, with some justification, that the foregoing discussion does not really involve strategic matters. Admittedly, it is
30. Id. at 5.17(3).
31. Id. at § 3.10.
32. Id. at § 4.9(6).
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probably a good thing for lawyers who invoke the common fund and
private attorney general exceptions to the American Rule about attorney fees to realize that those exceptions flow out of restitutionary principles. On the other hand, countless lawyers have raised these
exceptions without understanding the underlying rationale, and have
nevertheless recovered. There is, however, at least one important
strategic consideration that can arise in this context. Interestingly, it
is a strategic matter that is likely to be raised by a defendant resisting
an award of fees under these exceptions, rather than a plaintiff seeking them.
Those familiar with the substantive law of restitution know about
three closely related defenses to claims for restitution. The defensesall of which address the issue of the wrongfulness of the enrichmentinvolve "volunteers," "gifts" and "choice." Defendants who are the recipients of gifts, for example, clearly are enriched. However, that enrichment is clearly not unjust. If the students in a class, for example,
jointly decide to buy their teacher a new BMW because he is such a
good classroom teacher, clearly that teacher is enriched. But, just as
clearly he is not "unjustly" enriched. The same thing is true regarding
"volunteers." If a person voluntarily provides something to another,
the other may well be enriched. But, because of the voluntariness, the
enrichment is not unjust.
The choice principle is slightly different. In situations in which
this defense comes into play, the providers of the enrichment do not
themselves intend to provide that enrichment either as a gift or as
volunteers. Rather, when this enrichment is provided, the providers
themselves expect payment for it. If this occurs, the recipient cannot
assert either the gift or the volunteer principles. The students in a
teacher's class, for example, might give the teacher a BMW expecting
that the teacher will give all of them A's for the course. Hence, in this
situation, the teacher will be enriched, but the teacher cannot assert
either the gift or the volunteer principles. The teacher can, however,
assert the "choice" principle. "Had I been given a choice in advance,"
the teacher can argue, "I would not have accepted the BMW." The
choice defense, in short, again focuses on the unjust part of the unjust
enrichment idea. Though the recipient in these cases has been enriched, the enrichment is not unjust because had the recipient been
given an opportunity in advance to make a choice regarding the benefit, the benefit would have been refused.
What then does this have to do with strategic choices potentially to
be made by defendants who are resisting claims for attorney fees
under either the common fund or the private attorney general exceptions to the American Rule? The answer involves the non-named parties in common fund and private attorney general situations, the nonnamed parties who are said to be additional beneficiaries of the named
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plaintiffs' actions. What if the benefits received by these non-named
beneficiaries turn out to be gifts or the results of voluntary actions?
Or what if these benefits are ones that the non-named parties would
not have chosen to receive had they been given the choice in advance?
If any of these things can be established, the non-named beneficiaries
will not have been "unjustly" enriched. And, if they have not been
"unjustly" enriched, the benefits accruing to them need not be restored
in the form of payments for attorney fees to the named plaintiffs.
Let me now emphasize an important practical point. Serious
problems might stand in the way of defendants who attempt to assert
that non-named beneficiaries in common fund or private attorney general cases are the recipients of gifts or voluntary actions, or that those
beneficiaries would not have chosen to receive the benefits. For example, it might be argued that defendants lack the standing to assert
these ideas on behalf of the non-named beneficiaries. Further, no decisions have been found that support such an approach by defendants
incommon fund and private attorney general situations, nor even any
cases articulating this approach. Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, this idea makes sense. Since the common fund and private attorney general exceptions rest on restitutionary principles, restitutionary
principles should actually be applied when those exceptions are
invoked.
The final miscellaneous point about the strategic value of restitutionary remedies involves an arcane point-pre-judgment interest.
While this point may indeed appear arcane, it is important to note
that in at least some situations, large amounts of money are at stake.
Again, we start with a general rule, a rule known to all lawyers.
Generally speaking, pre-judgment interest is paid on claims if, but
only if, the claims themselves involve "liquidated" or "ascertainable"
amounts.33 A claim for $100,000 in personal injury losses, for example, almost certainly would be considered unliquidated, or non-ascertainable, especially if that claim included a call for money for pain and
suffering. On the other hand, a claim for failure to pay $100,000 on a
promissory note with a certain due date probably would be considered
liquidated or ascertainable. In effect, if the parties to a dispute disagree about the right to a remedy but not about the amount of that
remedy, the claim is liquidated. Conversely, if the parties disagree
about the amount of the remedy, the claim is not liquidated.
The limitation of pre-judgment interest to liquidated amounts is a
sensible idea. If the money value of the claim is not liquidated, the
amount of interest that can be earned on that amount cannot reasonably be calculated. Because the amount is not ascertainable prior to
judgment, defendants cannot know how much money to set aside pre38. Id. at § 3.6.
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judgment in order to pay pre-judgment interest that is calculated on a
post-judgment basis.
Generally, people or entities who possess property or money also
possess the right to earn interest on that property or money. Hence,
for example, if this author possesses $100,000 in cash, I also generally
possess the right to earn interest on that money. Imagine now, that
someone wrongfully obtains money or property. Obviously the wrongacting person possesses the money or property itself. The wrong-acting person now also possesses the right to earn interest on this money
or property. Here, in turn, is where restitutionary theories come into
play. If a defendant has been wrongfully enriched, full restitution
seems to require disgorgement of both the money or property itself
wrongfully possessed and any interest that the defendant might have
earned on the property or money while it was wrongfully held.
The interest just noted clearly includes pre-judgment earned interest. Hence, restitutionary claims seem to carry with them, almost automatically, the right to pre-judgment interest. Furthermore, and
perhaps more importantly, the restitutionary right to pre-judgment
interest probably even applies to unliquidated claims. And why not?
Measurement problems, problems that justify the general rule prohibiting payment of pre-judgment interest in connection with unliquidated claims are not the issue here. Rather, the issue in these
restitution cases is simply unjust enrichment.
D.

Enforcement of Restitutionary and Compensatory
Remedies

All of this brings this analysis to the most important strategic consequence that flows from a decision to seek a restitutionary rather
than a compensatory remedy. This consequence involves methods for
"enforcing" money remedies, i.e. methods for turning simple pieces of
34
paper-judgments for remedies-into actual money.
We start with something known to all experienced lawyers, but
often overlooked by novice lawyers and academic lawyers. Defendants
against whom judgments for money are entered do not automatically
comply with the judgments. In other words, such defendants do not
simply write out checks or hand over cash. Rather, these defendants
often stall and stall and stall, or, in some cases, just flatly refuse to
pay. Sometimes the defendant engages in this tactic because he or she
cannot comply with the judgment. A defendant who has no assets, for
example, simply cannot comply with an adverse judgment for
$100,000. Further, defendants sometimes do not comply with judgments-at least not fully-because they have many creditors in addition to the judgment creditor. A defendant who owes 10 creditors
34. See generally, Laycock, supra note 6, at 1290-91.
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$10,000 each, but who has only $50,000, will not be able to give each
creditor his or her due. Finally, defendants sometimes do not comply
with judgments simply because they choose not to do so. Some defendants, plainly stated, have the money to pay the judgment, but nevertheless refuse to pay.
It is in this context that perhaps the most important strategic differences exist between restitutionary money remedies and compensatory money remedies. 3 5 As a general rule, a judgment for a
compensatory money claim turns the loss of an injured party into a
"debt" of the injuring party. Injured parties, therefore, usually can
collect these debts only pursuant to standard debt collection procedures, and can collect these debts only alongside all of the other debts
of that injuring party. Thus, if the assets of an injuring party are limited, or if other debts of that party take precedence over the judgment,
or if bankruptcy is a viable option, the holder of a judgment for a compensatory money remedy may end up with little or no actual money.
Different rules, however, seem to apply to judgments for restitutionary money remedies. Three such different rules are critical. First,
unlike judgments for compensatory money remedies, which are essentially unsecured debts, judgments for restitutionary money are, in effect, "secured" debts.36 More significantly, the security in these
situations is the precise money or thing that is the subject of the unjust gain. If, for example, a piece of property changes possession because of mistake or fraud, a judgment for restitution regarding that
piece of property is, in effect, a secured debt with the property itself
the security. Likewise, if a particular and identifiable pot of money is
the source of unjust enrichment, a judgment for restitution regarding
that pot of money is, in effect, a secured debt with the pot of money
itself as the security. The consequences of this are profound. If the
secured item that is the object of a judgment for restitution is in the
possession of the defendant, collection of that judgment takes precedence over all of the other debts of the defendant, at least to the extent
of the security. Thus, for example, if the subject of a judgment for
restitution is a particular item, or a particular pot of money, the
holder of that judgment can claim the entire value of that pot, or the
entire value of that thing even though the debtor has several other
creditors and limited assets.
Second, because judgments for restitution are directly tied to specific things, changes in value of those things that have occurred prior
7
to the wrongful act may accrue to the benefit of the original owner.3
If, for example, a defendant converts property that subsequently in35. For an extensive discussion of the points made here, see Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. RIL. L. REv. 297.
36. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1291.
37. Id. at 1291-92.
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creases in value, the plaintiff in a suit for restitution might be able to
recover the increase. This might not be so if the suit were brought for
compensation.
The third advantage that holders of judgments for restitution have
over judgments for compensation is perhaps even more important
than the security or mortgage idea. This second advantage turns on
the arcane notion of "tracing."3 8 In many situations, the notion of
tracing allows the holder of a judgment for restitution to trace or follow an unjustly reaped gain from one form to another. For example, if
the original object of unjust enrichment is some type of property and if
the property is somehow sold or otherwise converted into money, the
holder of the judgment for restitution can trace or follow the money
with his claim. That money itself then becomes the object of the secured judgment. Thereafter, the holder of the judgment can take all of
the money so identified, even if the debtor has numerous other creditors and limited assets.
Consider now the extraordinary implications of the facts just noted
about the differences between judgments for compensation and judgments for restitution: Assume that Jones through fraud, gets both
Smith and Adams to sell to her their Ming vases for $100 a piece.
(Each vase is worth about $50,000.) Jones then sells the vases and
buys a $100,000 Rolls Royce for her boyfriend. Smith later sues Jones
in tort for a compensatory money remedy and Adams sues her for a
restitutionary money remedy with a constructive trust action. Both
Smith and Adams obtain judgments for $49,900. Smith's judgment, of
course, is for his loss. Adams' judgment, however, is for Jones' gain.
Then the problems begin. Jones' financial situation is bleak. She has
no cash. She owes various creditors approximately $100,000. Her
house is completely encumbered with a mortgage. Finally, the boyfriend has taken up with a new woman, and won't give back the car.
What then happens with Smith and Adams? Smith, it should be
recalled, has a judgment for a compensatory money remedy. Thus,
she has only a debt against Jones. However, since Jones has no assets
available to pay his debts, Smith gets nothing. Further, even if, somehow, Smith can draw the now missing Rolls back into Jones' pool of
assets, he would have to divide the proceeds from the sale of that car
among all of the creditors. Thus, even if this occurred, Smith would
only collect a fraction of his judgment.
Adams, however, is in much better shape. He has a judgment for a
restitutionary money remedy. Thus, he has, in effect, a "mortgage"
against the specific property (or money) that constitutes Jones' gain.
Further, Adams gets to "trace" that gain into other forms, including, of
course, the car now owned by the former boyfriend. Ultimately, there38. Id. at 1291.
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fore, Adams may well get the entire $49,900 of her judgment, despite
the fact that none of Jones' other creditors, including Smith, get anything at all.
Many judges, lawyers, and students might argue that nothing like
the foregoing should be allowed to occur in the law of civil remedies.
In the foregoing situation, of course, the injuries incurred by Adams
and Smith were identical, as were the gains reaped by Jones. Further, since in this situation losses equalled gains, the only real difference between the suits brought by Adams and Smith was the name
assigned to the remedy sought. Thus, only a hyper-technical system of
civil remedies, a system that has no place in the modern world, would
generate the different results described. The widely accepted view is
that similar factual circumstances ought to generate similar remedial
results.
Yet, these rules can potentially create wildly different results in
connection with remedies for essentially identical events. The merits
of these rules are debatable. However, regardless of the inconsistencies described, the rules of restitution and compensation are as noted.
Lawyers who wish to give their clients the best possible service, therefore, should know and understand these rules.
V. CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, it is probably safe to say that there is both
good news and bad news in connection with the knowledge possessed
by the practicing bar about "restitutionary" remedies. The good news
is that it is probably safe to say that most practicing lawyers have
heard of restitutionary remedies and probably even generally know
that restitutionary remedies have something to do with "unjust enrichment." The bad news, however, is this: It is also probably safe to
say that the vast majority of practicing lawyers do not truly understand restitutionary remedies, and do not understand why such remedies can be extraordinarily useful in certain circumstances. In short,
although most practicing lawyers know a little bit about restitutionary remedies, they do not know nearly enough.
Restitutionary remedies are powerful tools in the hands of lawyers
who truly understand them. There are procedural, strategic, and enforcement advantages to using restitutionary remedies. A lawyer who
does not avail himself of the advantages of restitution is not fully serving his clients.

